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Article 9

NOTES
THE EFFICACY OF A CHANGE OF VENUE IN PROTECTING A DEFENDANT'S
RIGHT TO AN ImPARTAL JURy

I. Intoduction
A person charged by the state with the commission of a crime is protected
by an arsenal of devices designed to insure his constitutional right to a fair trial.
Most conspicuous among these devices are the exclusionary rules of evidence, the
right to counsel, and the right to compulsory process. Yet, all of these are of
little or no value if the right to an impartial jury is not scrupulously preserved.'
Impartiality, as an ideal concept, is the logical derivative of the creation
of the trial as the means by which we reconstruct past events for the purpose
of rendering judgment. In theory, this concept requires judgment to be rendered
solely on the basis of the evidence produced at the trial.2 A slightly less rigorous
statement of this principle is that a juror, to be qualified, must be indifferent to
the guilt or innocence of the defendant "as he [the juror] stands unswome."'
"The theory of the law is that a juror who has formed an opinion cannot be
impartial." 4 Such theoretical purity, however, balks at practical application.
Chief Justice Waite said in Reynolds v. United States: "Every opinion which
he [the juror] may entertain need not necessarily have this effect [disqualification]."

This process of eroding impartiality, as a pure concept, in order to ac-

commodate it to the Supreme Court's notion of practical necessity, annunciated
in Reynolds, reached its height in Holt v. United States.6 There, it was decided
that a juror need not be disqualified for holding an opinion of such strength that
evidence would be required to remove it. If the opinion would yield to the
evidence produced at trial, that was sufficient.
Beginning with the theory that the trial must be the exclusive source of
information about the alleged offense upon which judgment is passed, the law
traced a path ending, in Holt, with the condonation of a practice which required only that judgment not be predicated upon an exclusively nontrial source.'
1 The guarantee of an impartial jury is embodied, expressly or impliedly, in the constitutions of all fifty states and the federal government. LEGisLATrvE DRAFTING RESEARcH
FUND, COLUmBrA UNvERsrrY, INDEX DIGEST OF STATR CONSTITUTIONS, 578-79 (2d ed.
1959). Moreover, while the fourteenth amendment imposes no duty upon the states to provide for trial by jury in criminal cases, if a jury is provided, it must be impartial. Irvin v.

Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
2 "The theory of our system is that the conclusions to be reached in a case will be
induced anby by evidence and argument in open court, and not by any outside influence,
whether of private talk or public print." Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907).
(Emphasis added.)
3 1 Coke Lit. 155b (1853).
4 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 155 (1878).

5

Ibid.

6 218 U.S. 245 (1910).
7 This practice is constitutionally permissible today. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717
(1961); Rees v. Payton, 225 F. Supp. 507 (E.D. Va. 1964), aff'd, 341 F.2d 857 (4th Cir.
1965). It would be erroneous, however, to conclude that the minimal constitutional requirements are indicative of present-day practice, at least in all courts. Appellate courts do caution
trial judges to exercise extreme care in examining prospective jurors and to disqualify them
if there is the least doubt as to their ability to render an impartial verdict. See, e.g., State
925
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Nevertheless, despite its dilution, the right to trial by an impartial jury, like the
right to a fair trial, is carefully guarded by a full complement of protective devices. Among such devices are the continuance,9 a change of judge, 0 the voir
v. Van Duyne, 43 N.J. 369, 204 A.2d 841 (1964). Compare United States v. Kline, 221
F. Supp. 776 (D. Minn. 1963) (all jurors who expressed an opinion on issue of guilt or innocence of defendant excused), with State v. St. Peter, 63 Wash. 2d 495, 387 P.2d 937 (1963)
(all potential jurors who had seen or heard of defendant excused). See also Juelich v. United
States, 214 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1954). There, the court reversed a conviction on the ground
that all twelve jurors believed the defendant guilty before the trial commenced. Juelich is
without precedent or progeny. This may he due to the unique circumstances existing there,
but it is difficult to distinguish Juelich from a case where less than all twelve jurors believe
the defendant guilty before hearing any testimony.
Some misgivings have been expressed regarding the first assumption underpinning Holt
v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 '(1910), which is that a juror has the ability to lay aside an
opinion once formed. "The influence that lurks in an opinion once formed is so persistent that
it unconsciously fights detachment from the mental processes of the average man." Irvin v.
Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 727 (1961). See generally Comment, Fair Trial v. Free Press: The
Psychological Effect of Pre-Trial Publicity on the juror's Ability to Be Impartial; A Plea
for Reform, 38 So. CAL. L. REv. 672 (1965). The authors there argue that the proposition
that a man can set aside an opinion once formed flies in the face of demonstrated psychological
fact. It is pointed out that association is an immediate response to perception (opinions
formed before all the facts are in), data tends to be interpreted to fulfill psychological needs,
the desire for social acceptance tends to exert a strong influence on the process of interpretation, and time intensifies the reaction against revision and change. Courts have not remained
unaware of the contribution of the psychic sciences. Commonly, the trial judge is reminded
that he is to make an independent evaluation of the prospective juror, not merely accept him
at his word because "jurors themselves are incapable of knowing the effect which prejudicial
matters might have upon their unconscious minds." People v. Hryciuk, 5 Ill. 2d 176, 184,
125 N.E.2d 61, 65 (1954).
The second underlying assumption in Holt, that "most people are essentially honest ...
[M]ost if not all jurors who qualify do so honestly and with no secret reservations . ... "
State ex rel. Sullivan v. Patterson, 64 Ariz. 40, 165 P.2d 309, 314 (1946), has also been
questioned. See generally Broeder, Voir Dire Examinations: An Empirical Study, 38 So. CAL.
L. REV. 503 '(1965). The author concludes that voir dire is an ineffective screening device
for the following reasons. There is an unwritten law that counsel do not take too long for
the voir dire examination; violation of this rule, which is infrequent because trial lawyers
seldom have the time or resources to adequately prepare an effective examination, irritates the
jurors. Conscious and deliberate lying is practiced by jurors. This is a protective device
owing to the fact that a juror, if challenged, will feel that he has been impugned, not part
of an overall wicked design. Jurors are also resentful over the discharge of another venireman
if they do not understand the justification for it. This study included the civil and criminal
cases of only one court. The validity of any generalization is, of course, an open question.
8 See generally Jaffe, The Press and the Oppressed-A Study of Prejudicial News
Reporting in Criminal Cases, 56 J. CRiam. L., C. & P.S. 1-17, 158-73 (1965); Note, Community
Hostility and the Right to an Impartial Jury, 60 COLUM. L. Rav. 349 (1960).
9 The leading case is Delaney v. United States, 199 F.2d 107 (1st Cir. 1952). See
generally Beck v. United States, 298 F.2d 622 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 919 (1962);
United States v. Hoffa, 156 F. Supp. 495 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (summary of principles governing
decision to grant or deny motion for continuance). The continuance is broader in scope than
the change of venue. In addition to protecting the defendant from the effects of community
prejudice, it is also designed to ameliorate the situation where the defendant is justifiably
unprepared for trial. Since the continuance is, by its very nature, dilatory, it is looked upon
with skepticism by the courts. There is considerable danger in advancing motions for a continuance and a change of venue alternately because it leaves the impression that counsel is
seeking only a delay. See generally Bailey & Golding, Remedies for Prejudicial PublicityChange of Venue and Continuance in Federal Criminal Procedure, 18 FED. B.J. 56 '(1958).
The danger is particularly great when one of the motions has been previously denied. See
People v. Brooks, 67 Ill. 2d 479, 214 N.E.2d 498 (Ct. App. 1966).
As a general proposition it can be said that counsel will encounter more difficulty in
obtaining a continuance than in obtaining a venue change. Note, COLUM. L. REv., supra
note 8, at 368-69.
10 This is regulated by statute in most jurisdictions. See, e.g., Aasz. R. Casm. P. 200;
CAL. Csv. PRoo. § 170; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 911.01 (1944); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 114-5
(Smith-Hurd 1964). The change of judge is usually made a matter of right upon compliance with the statutory requirements.
11 See generally Broeder, supra note 7; Orfield, Trial Jurors in Federal Criminal Cases,
29 F.R.D. 43 '(1961); Note, COLUM. L. Rav., supra note 8, at 354-60.

[Vol. 42:925]

NOTES

dire,1 l sequestration of the jury,'2 a change of venire or importation of a foreign
jury,"3 cautionary instructions," mistrial," and a change of venue.' This note
will focus on the use made of venue change by the courts, in order to protect
a defendant's right to a trial by an impartial jury."
II. Statutory Patterns
The power to remove a criminal case to a forum where an impartial jury
can be selected existed at common law,"s and, with the exception of Maine, 9
is codified in the constitutions20 and either statutes or rules of court 2 ' of every
state and the federal government.
§ 9-1810 (1956); N.Y. CODE CRim. PROc. § 414; OHIO REV.
§ 2945.31 '(Page 1954). Sequestration can become a two-edged sword. See United
States v. Holovachka, 314 F.2d 345 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 809 (1963), where
the defendant unsuccessfully contended that the trial court's sua sponte sequestration of the
jury was coercive and unfairly affected the verdict.
13 E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-1907 (1947); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 29.262 (1963);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-86 (Supp. 1965). The standards applied to a motion for a change of
venire are similar to those applied to a removal motion. Note, COLUM. L. REv., supra note 8,
at 365-67.
14 See generally United States v. Accardo, 298 F.2d 133 (7th Cir. 1962); Smith v.
United States, 236 F.2d 260 '(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 909 (1956). Failure to give
instructions, either protective or corrective, may constitute reversible error. United States v.
Accardo, supra. The rationale appears to be that cautionary instructions are effective. But
see Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440 (1949). "The naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury all practicing lawyers know to be an
unmitigated fiction." Id. at 453 (Jackson, J., concurring).
15 See generally Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959); State v. Puckett, 92
Ariz. 407, 377 P.2d 779 (1963).
16 See generally 2 ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES, §§
21:1-30 (1966); Austin, Prejudice and Change of Venue, 68 DICK. L. REV. 401 (1964);
Bailey & Golding, supra note 9; Morgan, Criminal Venue and Related Problems, 2 GA. S.B.
J. 331 (1966); Note, COLUm. L. REv., supra note 8, at 360-65; Note, "Free Press-FairTrial"
Revisited: Defendant-CenteredRemedies as a Publicity Policy, 33 U. CHI. L. REv. 512 (1966).
17 At the outset it must be noted that the great majority of cases on this subject deal
with the question of whether the defendant's removal motion was erroneously denied. Occasionally a case will be found where the defendant is attempting to resist a change of venue
granted on the state's motion, State ex rel. Sullivan v. Patterson, 64 Ariz. 40, 165 P.2d 309
(1946), or where the issue is jurisdictional in nature, revolving around the power of the
trial court to change venue, State ex rel. Fox v. La Porte Cir. Ct., 236 Ind. 69, 138 N.E.2d
875 (1956), but such a case is exceptional.
Accordingly, with the exception of the federal courts, where all indications are that
FED. R. CRIm. P. 21(a) is infrequently used by the district courts, ORFIELD, Op. Cit. supra
note 16, § 21:7, a study of the cases will reflect what the limit of the power of the trial court
is to deny a motion for a change of venue. A study of the cases will not show what the
practice of the trial courts is in granting such a motion.
18 Rex v. Cowle, 2 Burr. 834, 97 Eng. Rep. 587 (1759). An extensive account of the
common law practice is to be found in Crocker v. Justices, 208 Mass. 162, 94 N.E. 369 (1911).
19 Maine recently amended its statute to exclude criminal cases from the removal statute.
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 508 (Supp. 1966).
20 ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 75, ALA. CODE tit. 153 § 267 (1959); ARK. CONST. art. 2,
§ 10, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-1501 '(1947); COLO. CONST. art. V, § 37, CoLo. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 9-9-4 (1963); GA. CONST. art. VI, § 2-5001, GA. CODE ANN. § 27-1201 (1935);
HAWAII CONST. art. I, § 11, HAwArr REv. LAWS § 258-7 (1955); MD. CONST. art. IV,
§ 8, MD. ANN. CODE art. 75, § 44 (1957); N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 17; OKLA. CONST. art. II,
§ 20, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 561 (1937); PA. CONST. art. III, § 23, PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 19, § 551 (1930); S.C. CONST. art. 6, § 2; Tax. CONST. art. III, § 45, TEX. CODE CRus.
PRoc. ANN. art. 31.01 (1966); W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 14.
21 FED. R. CRIM. P. 21(a); ALASKA STAT. § 22.10.040 (Supp. 1962); Auiz. R. Cram. P.
201-11; CAL. PEN. CODE § 1033.5; CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 54-77 (Supp. 1966); DEL.
SUPER CT. (CRim.) R. 21; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 911.02 (1944); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-1801
(1948); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 146, § 18 (Smith-Hurd 1964); IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-1301
12

E.g., IND. ANN. STAT.

CODE ANN.
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This power, as codified, is usually limited to more serious offenses, 2 2 but
a growing number of jurisdictions provide for a change of venue in misdemeanor
prosecutions s New Hampshire, uniquely, requires ad hoc legislation, in response
to the trial court's recommendation, before a criminal case can be removed."
Several jurisdictions provide for a venue change, as a matter of right, when
certain specified objective standards are met,2" while a few others require that
specified minimum conditions be met before the defendant's motion will be
considered.2 8
Many statutes, by express provision, allow only one change of venue in a
case. 7 Courts have, however, usually rejected the argument that the governing
provision is the exclusive source of authority for changing venue, holding instead
that the controlling statute must yield as circumstances dictate rs
(1956), § 2-1432 (Supp. 1966); IowA CODE ANN. § 778.1 (1946); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
62-1318 (1964); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 452.210 (1963); LA. REV. STAT. § 15:290 (1950);
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 277, § 51 (1956); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.850 (1954); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 627.01 (1947); Miss. CODE ANN. § 2508 (1956); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 545.430 (1949);
Mo. SuP. CT. R- Crm. P. 30.01; MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-6901 (1947); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 25-410 '(1964); NEV. REV. STAT. § 174.410 (Supp. 1965); NJ. REV. STAT. § 2A;2-13
(1952); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 21-5-3 (Supp. 1965); N.Y. CODE Cim. PRoc. § 344; N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 1-84 (Supp. 1965); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-1501 (1960); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2931.29 *(Page 1953); ORE. REV. STAT. § 131.400 (Supp. 1963); R.I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. § 8-2-29 (1956); S.D. CODE § 34.0817 (Supp. 1960); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2201
(1955); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-26-1 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4631 (1958); VA.
CODE ANN. § 19.1-224 (1950); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.25.070 '(1961); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 956.03(3) (Supp. 1967); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-59 (1957).
22 E.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 778.1 '(1946) (felony); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 277, § 51
(1956) (capital offenses).
23 E.g., S.D. CODE § 34.0817 (Supp. 1960); W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 14. Of particular
significance is the recent case of Mason v. Pamplin, 232 F. Supp. 539 (W.D. Tex. 1964).
There, the refusal of the trial judge to allow the petitioner a hearing on his motion for a
change of venue because the governing article did not include prosecutions for misdemeanors,
was held violative of due process. In response to Mason, Texas amended the article. TEXAs
CODE UCRi. PRoc. ANN. art. 31.01 (1966). See generally Annot., 38 A.L.R.2d 738 (1954).
24 N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 17.
25 E.g., ASUz. R. Cim. P. 206(B) (if defendant submits affidavits supporting his motion
from 10% of the qualified voters); GA. CODE ANN. § 27-1201 (1935) (evidence of physical
violence). This provision is rather strictly construed, Blevins v. State, 108 Ga. App. 738, 134
S.E.2d 496 (1963), rev'd on other grounds, 220 Ga. 720, 141 S.E.2d 426 (1965); IND. ANN.
STAT. § 9-1301 (1956) (capital offense), § 2-1432 (Supp. 1966) (after an appellate court
reverses and remands for a new trial). See Mitchell v. State, 233 Ind. 16, 115 N.E.2d 595
(1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 975 (1954). Mo. ANN. STAT. § 545.490 (1949), if the defendant supports his motion by affidavits from five credible persons residing in different neighborhoods in the county, provided the population of the county is less than 75,000. This
means that a change of venue can be had, as a matter of right, in 110 out of 114 counties
in Missouri. This unique provision has been explained as the product of an earlier era when
the trial was the principal means of entertainment in rural communities. Williamson, Change
of Venue, 22 J. Mo. B. 74 (1966).
26 E.g., ARx. STAT. ANN. § 43-1502 (1947) (defendant must present the affidavits of
two qualified electors, unrelated to defendant); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 561 (1937)
(three credible persons residing in the county).
27 E.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-1305 (1956); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 627.01 (1947); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 956.03(3) (Supp. 1967).
28 In State ex rel. Fox v. La Porte Cir. Ct., 236 Ind. 69, 138 N.E.2d 875 (1956), it was
held that the trial judge lacked the power to grant a second change of venue, regardless of the
circumstances. Fox, however, was substantially limited if not overruled in State ex rel. Gannon
v. Porter Cir. Ct., 239 Ind. 637, 159 N.E.2d 713 (1959). There it was said "it [is] . . . the
duty of the judiciary to provide to every accused a public trial by an impartial jury, even though
to do so the court must grant a second change of venue and thus contravene [the statute] ....
Id. at 642, 159 N.E.2d at 715. The Minnesota Supreme Court in State v. Thompson, 273
Minn. 1, 139 N.W.2d 490, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966), said that a defendant's right
to a fair trial could not be circumscribed by the statute limiting the courts power to grant
only one change of venue. Similarly, it was said in State v. Nutley, 24 Wis. 2d 527, 129
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A number of states allow removal on the prosecutor's motion.29 There has
been a rather sharp split of authority on the issue of whether this is constitutionally
permissible,"0 with a majority of courts sustaining the statutory power of the
trial judge to change venue in such cases."'
Although the typical provision for a change of venue vests the trial judge
with power to remove a case on the defendant's application, several states permit
the court to change venue on its own motion. 2 New Mexico is unique in providing for removal upon the stipulation of the prosecution and the defense."3
III. Judicial Implementation
A. Judicial Disposition
The usual provision regulating removal is cast in broad, general terms.
Typically, the defendant must show that there is such excitement or prejudice
in the minds of the inhabitants of the forum county or district that he cannot
receive a fair and impartial trial therein. The courts have formulated verbal
standards of varying intensity 4 in the attempt to implement these provisions in
specific cases, but, as has been pointed out, despite these various formulations,
there is considerable uniformity in removal practice.3 3
Likewise, there is considerable uniformity in the judicial attitude toward
motions for a change of venue - the motion is disfavored. This judicial reticence
is evidenced by numerous cases that hold that the issue is one for the discretion of the trial judge; 6 and absent a showing that there was an abuse of
N.W.2d 155 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 918 (1965) that statutes allowing only one change
of venue may require modification in order to meet due process requirements.
29 E.g., Amz. R. Cram. P. 201; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 911.02(1) (1944).
30 Compare State ex rel. Sullivan v. Patterson, 64 Ariz. 40, 165 P.2d 309 (1946), with
Blume v. State, 244 Ind. 141, 189 N.E.2d 568, 570 n.2 (1963) (dictum). The federal courts
cannot remove a federal case except on the defendant's application. 2 ORIELD, Op. Cit. supra
note 16, § 21:5. See generally Annot., 161 A.L.R. 949 (1946); Annot., 80 A:L.R. 355 (1932).
31 The defendant usually premises his objection to a charge on the accused's traditional
right to be tried in the -"vicenage." This rule is explained in detail in State v. Brown, 103
Vt. 312, 154 Adt. 579 (1931) and best explained in United States v. Cores, 356 U.S. 405
(1958). "The provision for trial in the vicinity of the crime is a safeguard against the unfairness and hardship involved when an accused is prosecuted in a remote place." Id. at 407.
The majority response is to say that the defendant has a right to an impartial trial in
the county in which the crime is alleged to have been committed, not a right to an impartial
trial and a right to a trial in the county where the crime is alleged to have been committed.
State ex rel. Sullivan v. Patterson, 64 Ariz. 40, 165 P.2d 309 (1946). Trial courts, however,
are admonished to grant such removal motions.with caution. Ibid.
32 E.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 1033.5.
33 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 21-5-3.1 (Supp. 1965).
34 Haynes v. State, 40 Ala. App. 106, 109 So. 2d 738 (1958), cert. denied, 268 Ala.
546, 109 So. 2d 746 (1959) (must clearly be shown that a fair and impartial trial cannot be
had); State v. Turner, 193 Kan. 189, 392 P.2d 863 (1964) (must be shown with reasonable
certainty that a fair trial cannot be had); People v. Anderson, 350 Ill. 603, 183 N.E. 588
(1932) (must show reasonable grounds for fear that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had).
35 Note, COLUm. L. Rlv., supra note 8, at 362.
36 State v. Hunt, 2 Ariz. App. 6, 406 P.2d 208 (1965) '(wholly within the trial judge's
discretion); McGruder v. State, 96 Ga. App. 874, 102 S.E. 2d 54 (1958) (where there is conflicting evidence the decision denying a change of venue will not be reversed).
The extensive discretionary authority with which the trial judge is vested can best be
seen in State v. BeBee, 110 Utah 484, 175 P.2d 478 (1946). After commenting on the ease
with which the jury was selected, and the orderly conduct of the trial, the court continued:
[We] will not say that the trial court abused its discretion . . . . However, it certainly would not have been error for the court to have granted a change of venue
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discretion,"7 no appellate relief will be granted. It is also shown by cases that
strictly construe provisions that authorize the removal of criminal cases.s
B. The Law
Courts presume that a criminal accused will be able to secure an impartial
jury in the county or district in which the indictment is returned. He has the
burden of rebutting this presumption."9 Prejudicial newspaper publicity is the
ground most frequently asserted in support of a motion for a change of venue.
With few exceptions,4' this type of motion has been rather consistently denied."'
This is understandably the case when the newspaper publicity did not refer to the
defendant in a significant way; 2 when it was factual and restrained; 3 and,
possibly, when it was not calculated to influence the jury. 4 The same result,
however, is reached when the newspaper publicity contains an extremely detailed
account of the case, 5 is inflammatory in nature," has a tendency to excite prejudice,4 ' or is denunciatory in tone."
and we are of the opinion that it would have been better if the trial court had
granted the change under the circumstances of this case where there were inflammatory newspaper comments; suggestive remarks of a church official quoted in the
paper; the gathering of an armed mob; a comparatively small community, no doubt
closely knit by church affiliations; a deceased well known to the community . . .
and an obviously eccentric old man . . . whose penchant for rhetorical showmanship
repulses what little tolerance might otherwise have been accorded him. 175 P.2d
at 481-82.
Not infrequently a case upholding the denial of a removal motion and simultaneously
expatiating on the evils of pretrial publicity is to be found. E.g., State v. Hunt, supra; Singer
v. State, 109 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1959).
37 Examples of an abuse of discretion include a decision made by a trial judge without
the benefit of a hearing, e.g., State v. Moore, 258 N.C. 300, 128 S.E.2d 563 (1962), and in
some jurisdictions a denial of a defendant's motion for a change of venue after an uncontradicted hearing, e.g., Brunner v. Commonwealth, 395 S.W.2d 382 (Ky. 1965); Rush v. State,
238 Ark. 149, 379 S.W.2d 29 (1964).
38 See, e.g., United States v. Kline, 205 F. Supp. 637 (D. Minn. 1962):
I am satisfied from a reading of these decisions that pre-trial motions for transfers
[under FED. R. CRIM. P. 21(a)] . . . should be granted sparingly, in exceptional
cases requiring such unusual action, and then only when it appears with a fair
certainty that it is unlikely that a fair trial can be had ....
Id. at 639-40.
The Wyoming Supreme Court has provided an excellent example of the use to which
strict construction can be put. The Wyoming statute provides that a defendant's motion for
a change of venue is to be granted on a showing "that the trial would be more impartial in
another county ...
." Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-59 (1957).
In State v. Hambrick, 65 Wyo. 1,
196 P.2d 661 (1948), this rather lenient provision was construed to mean that a defendant
must show the prejudice against him is so great that he could not receive a fair and impartial
trial unless the motion were granted.
39 Farrow v. Commonwealth, 197 Va. 353, 89 S.E.2d 312 (1955).
40 Juelich v. United States, 214 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1954); United States v. Parr, 17
F.R.D. 512 '(S.D. Tex. 1955).
41 "[N]ewspaper publicity alone is not grounds for a 'Change of Venue.'" State v.
Odom, 369 S.W.2d 173, 180 (Mo. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 993 (1944).
42 United States v. Malinsky, 20 F.R.D. 300 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
43 People v. Dery, 219 N.E.2d 536 (Ill. 1966); State v. Brown, 31 Wash. 2d 475, 197
P.2d 590 (1948).
44 United States v. Guterma, 173 F. Supp. 218 (E.D.N.Y. 1959).
45 See Singer v. State, 109 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1959); State v. Williams, 245 Iowa 494, 62
N.W.2d 742 '(1954).
46 United States v. Moran, 236 F.2d 361 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 909 (1956);
State v. McGee, 91 Ariz. 101, 370 P.2d 261, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 844 (1962); State v.
Hillman, 42 Wash. 615, 85 Pac. 63 (1906).
47 Bianchi v. United States, 219 F.2d 182 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 915 (1955)
(continuance).
48 State v. Truman, 124 Vt. 285, 204 A.2d 93 '(1964).
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The reasoning of the courts in these cases appears to be that although
publicity is a necessary prerequisite to a general prejudicial sentiment towards
the defendant in the community, it is not itself that sentiment, nor generally
is it a reliable indication of a prejudicial atmosphere. Several arguments are
proferred in support of this position. It is said, if the rule were otherwise a
sensational case could never come to trial."' It is also urged that intelligent
people do not
consider newspaper publicity reliable,50 and its effect, if any, is
5l
ephemeral.
The following have, at various times and in various combinations, supported
decisions granting a venue change, or reversing a trial judge's denial of such
a motion: prejudicial statements coming from some official source,52 provided
that they were publicized at a date close to the trial;5" the publication of in49

(1878).

In these days of newspaper enterprise and universal education, every case of public
interest is almost, as a matter of necessity, brought to the attention of all intelligent
people in the vicinity, and scarcely anyone can be found among those best fitted
for jurors who has not read or heard of it, and who has not some impression or
some opinion in respect to its merits. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 155-56

Cf., People v. Sandgrev, 109 Misc. 810, 75 N.Y.S.2d 753 (Sup. Ct. 1947), rev'd on
other grounds, 277 App. Div. 217, 98 N.Y.S.2d 371 (1950), rev'd on other grounds, 302
N.Y. 331, 98 N.E.2d 460 (1951). There, the court argued, rather pointedly, that were it
to conclude the defendant could not receive a fair and impartial trial in New York City, it
would have to conclude that he could not be fairly tried anywhere.
50 Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910) (opinion of Holmes, J.) (by implication).
51 People v. Sollazzo, 106 N.Y.S.2d 600 '(Sup. Ct. 1951).
52 United States v. Florio, 13 F.R.D. 296 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). Statements originating from
the New York Crime Commission, referring to the defendant as a "mobster," and containing
accounts of the defendant's prior criminal activity were carried in the newspapers on the
morning the jury was to be summoned. The decision was not grounded primarily on the
reason that readers would consider the publicity reliable, but on a combination of factorsthe publicized matter was of a peculiarly local interest, unusually intense, and released on
the very day the jury was to be empanelled. A later case, United States v. Bonanno, 177
F. Supp. 106 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Bufalino, 285
F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1959), indicated that the significance to be attached to publicity originating
is that the government cannot urge the inconfrom an official- governmental -source
venience and expense which attends a change of venue as a reason for denying the defendant's
motion. But see, State v. Thompson, 265 Minn. 385, 123 N.W.2d 378 (1963) where the
court found statements made by the police particularly objectionable because they purported to be authoritative and factual. People v. McKay, 37 Cal. 2d 792, 236 P.2d 145
(1951) (publication of a letter of the trial judge impugning the good faith of defense counsel);
People v. Pfanschmidt, 262 Ill. 411, 104 N.E. 804 (1914) '(sheriff publicized his belief in
defendant's guilt).
The basis of all these decisions is either a variant of estoppel or the probability that
the publicized matter will be accepted as reliable. There is no notion of granting a change
of venue as punishment for reprehensible and unethical conduct. Indeed, removal motions
may be denied even though the court strongly disapproves of the prosecuting attorney's
conduct. See, e.g., United States v. Dioguardi, 20 F.R.D. 33 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (statements
made by the prosecutor tending to foreclose the issue of guilt); State v. Hunt, 2 Ariz. App.
6, 406 P.2d 208 (1965), where, in a prosecution for child beating, the county attorney
appeared on television several times to discuss the case, child beating in general, and the
need for legislation.
In the converse situation, where the publicity originated from the defendant's own act,
it has been held that he cannot complain. Reynolds v. United States, 225 F.2d 123 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 914 (1955).
53 United States v. Florio, supra note 52. See United States v. Carper, 13 F.R.D. 483
(D.D.C. 1953) '(nine months). But see, United States v. Dioguardi, supra note 52 (less than
two months).
While the existence of prejudicial publicity close to the time of trial may dispose a
court to view a removal application favorably, the fact that publicity ceased, or even diminished, some time before the trial is frequently cited as a reason for denying a change of venue.
United States v. Kline, 205 F. Supp. 637 (D. Minn. 1962); United States v. Bonanno, supra
note 52; Elias v. Territory, 9 Ariz. 1, 76 Pac. 605 (1904); Parson v. State, 222 A.2d 326
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admissible evidence; 4 the relative density of the publicity; 5 publicity of an
unusual variety or intensity;" organized campaigns designed to prejudice the
defendant;5" heinous crimes;58 crimes affecting the whole community; 59 and mob

(Del. 1966); State v. Williams, 245 Iowa 494, 62 N.W. 2d 742 (1954); State v. Ellis, 271
Minn. 345, 136 N.W.2d 384 (1965).
The rationale behind these decisions is that a mere lapse of time is sufficient to abate
the prejudice. In Morgan, supra note 16, at 334-36, the author points to the case of Blevins
v. State, 108 Ga. App. 738, 134 S.E.2d 496 (1963), rev'd on other grounds, 220 Ga. 720,
141 S.E.2d 426 '(1965), where the defendant's first trial was conducted in an atmosphere
of prejudicial publicity. This atmosphere had evaporated by the time of the second trial in
which the defendant was acquitted. The author contends this lends support to the proposition
that the tendency of prejudicial publicity to infect a trial is inversely related to its immediacy.
54 United States ex rel. Bloeth v. Denno, 313 F.2d 364 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 372 U.S.
978 (1963) (prior criminal record). It must be noted, however, this was only one factor
among many which led to the decision in Bloeth. Generally the publicity of inadmissible
evidence is not a sufficient ground for a change of venue. See, e.g., Odom v. Nash, 226 F.
Supp. 855 (W.D. Mo. 1964); Pacheco v. State, 414 P.2d 100 (Nev. 1966).
55 United States v. Florio, 13 F.R.D. 296 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). Where the publicity is
widespread, or the subject matter of the case is likely to attract widespread comment, and the
court of application sits in a heavily populated district, it is often said the impersonal and
vacant atmosphere is a positive advantage to the defendant. See application of Cohn, 332
F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1964); United States v. Dioguardi, 20 F.R.D. 33 '(S.D.N.Y. 1956); People
v. Sandgren, 109 Misc. 810, 75 N.Y.S.2d 753 (Sup. Ct. 1947), rev'd on other grounds, 277
App. Div. 217, 98 N.Y.S.2d 371 (1950), rev'd on other grounds, 302 N.Y. 331, 98 N.E.2d
460 (1951).
The cases go further than this, however, indicating that the defendant must suggest a
district free of prejudice, United States v. Carper, 13 F.R.D. 483 (D.D.C. 1953), and demonstrate that his right to an impartial jury will be secured in another community. See generally
United States v. Bando, 244 F.2d 833 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 844 (1957); United
States v. Mesarosh, 223 F.2d 449 '(3d Cir. 1955), rev'd on other grounds, 352 U.S. 1 (1956);
Odom v. Nash, supra note 54; Parson v. State, 222 A.2d 326 (Del. 1966).
The reasoning behind these cases is that no useful purpose would be served by changing
venue when the publicity is widespread and that courts must get on with their business even
though conditions are not at an optimum level. As was stated in United States v. Dennis,
183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950), aff'd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
Certainly we must spare no effort to secure an impartial panel; but those who may
have in fact committed a crime cannot secure immunity because it is possible that
the jurors who try them may not be exempt from the general feelings prevalent
in the society in which they live; we must do as best we can with the means we
have. Id. at 226.
It has been suggested the better approach would be to allow the defendant to make
this decision himself, once he has shown the facts necessary to warrant a change of venue.
Note, COLUM. L. Rav., supra note 8, at 364 n.86. The recent case of State v. Thompson,
265 Minn. 385, 123 N.W.2d 378 (1963), takes this approach.
56 United States v. Bletterman, 279 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1960), (not unusual; motion
denied); State v. Woolery, 93 Ariz. 76, 378 P.2d 751 (1963) '(not unusual; motion denied);
State v. Thompson, supra note 55 (unusual; motion granted). But cf., Hagans v. State, 372
S.W.2d 946 (Tex. Crim. App. 1962), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 957 (1963) (unusual; motion
denied).
57 E.g., State v. Hillman, 42 Wash. 615, 85 Pac. 63 (1906) (ad hoc voluntary association). But cf., Wood v. United States, 357 F.2d 425 '(10th Cir. 1966) (allegation that police
department attempted to intimidate witnesses not within the compass of FED. R. CRms. P.
21(a)); see, Singer v. State, 109 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1959) (bar association offered reward for
defendant's capture).
58 The law's response to this factor has been ambiguous. It is frequently asserted that
a heinous crime will be equally offensive in another community. People v. Allen, 413 Ill.
69, 107 N.E.2d 826 (1952) (child molesting); People v. Sandgren, 109 Misc. 810, 75 N.Y.S.2d
753 (Sup. Ct. 1947), rev'd on other grounds, 277 App. Div. 217, 98 N.Y.S.2d 371 (1950),
rev'd on other grounds, 302 N.Y. 331, 98 N.E.2d 460 (1951) (defendant's dogs mauled child
to death). But see, People v. Pfanschmidt, 262 Ill. 411, 104 N.E. 804 (1914) (murder and
dismemberment of bodies).
59 E.g., Miller v. Commonwealth, 248 Ky. 717, 59 S.W.2d 969 (1933) (bank failure);
People v. Jackson, 114 App. Div. 697, 100 N.Y. Supp. 126 (1906), where to increase burial
fees, defendants ordered the dismembering of bodies of friends and relatives of the veniremen.
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domination."0 The last factor has, more than any other, consistently resulted in
a holding that the defendant is entitled to a change of venue. The reason for
this is readily understandable. Mob domination is the result of group cohesion
cemented in sernispontaneous fashion from within rather than by a formal organizational structure from without, engaging in abnormal behavior, indicative
of intense feelings of wrath or revulsion, and not amenable to reason and calm,
detached reflection. In short, it is highly reliable if not conclusive proof of a
general prejudicial sentiment existent in the forum.
IV. Voir Dire
The preceding section attempted to state the law governing change of venue
in criminal cases. This is an extremely hazardous undertaldng for basically two
reasons. First, many cases are devoid of an adequate factual analysis, the decision
being justified by the invocation of a formula, such as, absent an abuse of
discretion, the trial court's decision must stand. Second, even where there is an
adequate factual analysis, a high level of abstraction is not possible because courts
do not conceive of the problem in terms of technical, sharply distinguishable
concepts. 6 Rather, each case is approached in terms of the presumption that
a defendant can receive a fair and impartial trial in the particular county, the
requested relief being granted only when there is a sufficient accumulation of
multifarious factors that, in their totality, rebut this presumption. Although this
means that the cases are confused, inconsistent, and chaotic when compared
factually, it does not mean that they are devoid of any unifying principle of
intelligibility.
The concept of voir dire seems to be a tolerably efficient unifying principle
of intelligibility with which to examine the problem of removal in criminal cases.
60 Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923); Carruthers v. Reed, 102 F.2d 933 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 307 U.S. 643 (1939). At a minimum the defendant has a right to be
free from physical violence or threat thereof. See, e.g., People v. Arthur, 314 Ill. 296, 145
N.E. 413 (1924); State v. Dryman, 269 P.2d 796 (Mont. 1954); State v. BeBee, 110 Utah
484, 175 P.2d 478 (1946) (by implication). Contra, Shepherd v. State, 46 So. 2d 880 (Fla.
1950), rev'd on other grounds, 341 U.S. 50 (1951); see Blevins v. State, 108 Ga. App. 738,
134 S.E.2d 496 (1963), rev'd on other grounds, 220 Ga. 720, 141 S.E.2d 426 '(1965).
Some cases indicate that the defendant's right to present his case in a calm and dignified atmosphere, without interference, is the right being protected. See, e.g., Yancey v.
State, 98 Ga. App. 797, 107 S.E.2d 265 (1959); State v. BeBee, supra Cf., Sheppard v.
Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965). Contra, Shepherd v.
State, supra.
A third group of cases suggests the defendant is being protected from the ]rejudicial
atmosphere of which the mob domination is indicative. See, e.g., Seals v. State, 208 Miss.
236, 44 So. 2d 61 (1950). Cf., People v. McKay, 37 Cal. 2d 792, 236 P.2d 145 (1951).
Contra, State v. BeBee, supra.
61 This approach has not gone without criticism. It has been suggested that courts
analyze prejudicial publicity in terms of six categories. They are confessions; prior criminal
activity; incriminating tangible evidence; statements of persons who do not, or might not,
testify; reports of proceedings from which the jury has been excluded; and miscellaneous
inflammatory matter. Jaffe, The Press and the Oppressed-A Study of Prejudicial News
Reporting in Criminal Cases, 56 J. Cum. L.C. & P.S. 4-7 (1965).
It has also been suggested that courts create absolute qualitative '(proscribing the publication of confessions, prior criminal activity, extended official comment, etc.) and quantitative
(proscribing X inches of newspaper print concerning the case, within Y months before trial)
standards, the violation of which would entitle the defendant to relief as of right. Note, U.
CHr. L. REv., supra note 16, at 525-26.
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This can best be illustrated by a line of cases which stand for the proposition
"that the ultimate question involved in a motion for change of venue on the
ground of prejudice is whether it is possible to select a fair and impartial
jury ....

"62

This line of cases can be grouped into three categories.

First, there are those cases that contain a general statement of the proposition. "[T]he prejudice must be so great that traditional voir dire procedures...
were unavailing to ensure a fair trial."'" "[W]e fail to see any error .. .where
there has been no showing . . . that a qualified jury was not selected .....,",
[T]he decision of the trial court in denying [a change of venue] ...will not
be considered as cause for reversal, unless it is made to appear from the
voir dire examination of the jury that the appellant may have been denied
a fair trial because of bias and prejudice of the jury.65
Finally, in State v. Thompson,6" the Minnesota Supreme Court, after reviewing
the trial judge's denial of a motion for a change of venue by writ of mandamus,
reversed, declaring that it was satisfied of the improbability of securing a fair
and impartial jury.
The second group of cases are those which are more attentive to the particulars of the jury selection process. Often it is noted that the trial judge was
satisfied with the jury,68 or that the jury was selected with ease.69 When the
record shows that difficulty was encountered in empanelling the jury, the typical
response by an appellate court is to the effect that the trial judge was diligent
and exhaustive in his efforts to insure the defendant a trial by an impartial jury."0
Defense counsel's failure to make any challenges for cause' or to continue making
such challenges until met with denial 2 have also .been cited as reasons for up.
W
holding the trial court's denial of a removal motion.
It is the failure to exercise all preemptory challenges, however, which presents a constantly recurring theme." If the ability to empanel a jury is, in fact,
the ultimate question on the issue of removal, one might have expected the courts
to fashion an applicable concept of waiver, arguing that by refusing to exercise
all of his preemptory challenges, the defendant has declined to use the voir dire
to its fullest extent and will not be heard when he seeks to invoke another protective device. Generally, this has not been done. Rather, the courts usually say
that the failure to exercise preemptory challenges is a significant, though not
62

20RFIELD,

Op.

cit. supra note 16,

§

21:13.

63 Pacheco v. State, 414 P.2d 100, 103 (Nev. 1966).
64 Benefield v. State, 151 So. 2d 650, 664 (Fla. Ct. App. 1963), rev'd on other grounds,
160 So. 2d 706 (Fla. 1964).
65 Bradley v. State, 245 Ind. 331, 335, 198 N.E.2d 762, 764 (1964) (alternate holding).
66 265 Minn. 385, 123 N.W.2d 378 (1963).
67 Accord, United States v.Florio, 13 F.R.D. 296 "(S.D.N.Y.1952).
68 United States v. Bando, 244 F.2d 833 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 844 (1957).
69 Virgin Islands v.Rivera Solis, 359 F.2d 518 (3d Cir. 1966).
70 See State v. McGee, 91 Ariz. 101, 370 P.2d 261 (1962).
71 State v. Woolery, 93 Ariz. 76, 378 P.2d 751 (1963).
72 Bradley v. State, 245 Ind. 331, 198 N.E. 2d 762 (1964) (alternate holding).
73 E.g., Virgin Islands v.Rivera Solis, 359 F.2d 518 '(3d Cir. 1966); Territory v. Shankland, 3 Ariz. 403, 77 Pac. 492 (1892); People v. Allen, 413 Ill. 69, 107 N.E.2d 826 (1952).
See generally Note, Peremptory Challenges and Change of Venue, 27 U. CINO. L. REV. 87
(1958).
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dispositive, factor. 4 There is, however, some ambiguity on this issue. 5
The third group of cases illustrating the strategic importance of the voir dire
on the issue of a change of venue comes from the federal district courts where the
normal procedure is to deny a motion for removal made before the voir dire
examination, with leave to renew after the completion of the examination.'
The conclusion to be drawn from an examination of this line of cases is that
many courts do not conceive of removal as an independent protective device,
but subordinate its role to procedures regulating the selection of the jury. Change
of venue is seen as part of a hierarchical structure of protective devices which is
triggered only in the event of a malfunction at an upper echelon.7
There remains, however, the question of whether courts are correct in maintaining this view. It could be contended that this conception of removal cannot
be justified by the typical statute or rule regulating change of venue." To conceive of removal as less than an independent remedial device is to regard it as
no more than a supplement to the statutes or rules governing the selection of
the jury, yet each has been treated independently by the lawmakers. If removal were meant to be a dependent, protective device one would expect to
find it as the final paragraph in the particular statute or nile regulating jury
selection, in language to the effect that should all else fail the defendant shall be
entitled to a venue change. But in fact, this has not been done. Further, the
typical statute or rule providing for removal is cast in terms of prejudice or
excitement, in the minds of the inhabitants of the community, so great that the
defendant cannot receive a fair trial. Thus, removal should be regarded as an
independent protective device that requires inquiry into the prevailing com-

74 See United States ex reL. Darcy v. Handy, 351 U.S. 454 (1956). Contra, O1emmons
v. State, 398 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. Grim. App. 1966). "[T]here is no showing that [the defendant] . . . was forced to accept any objectional [sic] juror." Id. at 566.
The significance attached to this factor is, presumably, that trial counsel did not consider
the exercise of all preemptory challenges as necessary to insure the defendant's right to an
impartial jury; his opinion is entitled to great weight. The validity of assigning such significance to the failure to exercise all preemptory challenges has been questioned. The attorney, faced with an objectionable prospective juror, may exercise a preemptory challenge only
to find himself faced with a more objectionable prospect, who cannot be challenged for cause.
ABA, AnvIsoRY Comm. REPORT ON FREE PRESS AND FAIR TRIAL STANDARD

RELATING TO

FREE PRESS AND FAIR TRIAL 127 (tent. draft 1966). The resolution of this dilemma cannot
be characterized as other than acquiescence in the lesser of two evils.
75 Compare State v. Lindberg, 125 Wash. 51, 215 Pac. 41 (1923), with State v. Griffith,
52 Wash. 2d 721, 328 P.2d 897 '(1958).
76 See, e.g., Blumenfield v. United States, 284 F.2d 46 (8th Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
365 U.S. 812 (1961). "The ultimate question is whether it is possible to select a fair and
impartial jury, and the proper occasion for such a determination is upon the voir dire." Id.
at 51. Colosacco v. United States, 196 F.2d 165 (10th Cir. 1952). This is also the procedure with regard to motions for a continuance. United States v. Medlin, 353 F.2d 789
(6th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 973 (1966).
There are only two reported cases from the federal district courts in which a change of
venue was granted before the voir dire examination. United States v. Parr, 17 F.R.D. 512
(S.D. Tex. 1955); United States v. Florio, 13 F.R.D. 296 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). In Florio
removal was granted because the court was satisfied that an impartial jury could not be
empanelled. In Parr the court made no mention of the probable inability of selecting an
impartial jury.
77 An exception to this would be those cases holding the trial court abused its discretion.
See note 37 supra.
78 The following discussion is hypothetical because the issue appears never to have been
raised before any court.
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munity sentiment rather than a subordinate procedure concerned with the state
of mind of individual prospective jurors.
To the contrary, it may be argued that the courts' view of removal is the
valid one since the voir dire examination affords an excellent opportunity to
sound out community sentiment.79 Moreover, several statutes explicitly recogize
the inability to select an impartial jury as grounds for a change of venue.8"
As for those provisions that are cast in terms of the prejudice in the minds of the
inhabitants of the community that is so great as to deny a defendant his right
to a fair and impartial jury, it may be argued that community prejudice can
operate to defeat this right in only two situations, viz., when an impartial jury
cannot be selected and, if selected, it would be intimidated by a dominant sentiment of prejudice in the community."' This argument goes too far, however, if
it concludes as a general proposition that the successful completion of the voir
dire is fatal to a motion for a change of venue. The reason for this was best
stated in Seals v. State,82 where the voir dire revealed that approximately sixty
percent of the veniremen were excused because they were prejudiced against
the defendant. The court said:
The requirement of the law is not satisfied by the mere empanelling of
12 men against whom no legal complaint can be made. The defendant
is entitled to be tried in a county where a fair proportion of the people
qualified for jury service may be used as a venire from which a jury may
be secured to try his case fairly and impartially, and uninfluenced
by a
83
preponderant sentiment that he should be flung to the lions.
Usually the "preponderant sentiment" will be evidenced by some form of
mob violence or threat thereof, as was the case in Seals."4 Community prejudice,
however, can express itself in more subtle forms, that are no less harmful. Situations where community prejudice is likely to exist and adversely affect an
otherwise impartial jury include the small, well-knit community, where the defendant is regarded as an outsider because he has only recently become a
resident of the community;85 is of a different race86 or social class;87 possesses
annoying personal eccentricities;"8 or, for one reason or another, the community
tends to identify with the victim of the crime.89 Also dangerous is the situation
where the defendant has fallen drastically in the esteem of his fellows, 0 caused
79

"The chief significance of the voir dire examination . . . is that it reflected . . .

the pulse of the community in which petitioner was brought to trial." United States ex rel.
Brown v. Smith, 200 F. Supp. 885, 905 (D. Vt. 1961), rev'd, 306 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 372 U.S. 959 (1963).
80 E.g., MONT. Ruv. ConEs ANN. § 94-6901 (1947); N.D. CENT. CODE- § 29-1501 (1960);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 21-5-3 (Supp. 1965).
81 State v. Alsup, 69 Nev. 121, 243 P.2d 256 (1952).
82 208 Miss. 236, 44 So. 2d 61 (1950).
83 Id. at 248-49, 44 So. 2d at 67.
84 See cases cited note 60 supra.
85 See United States ex rel. Brown v. Smith, 200 F. Supp. 885 (D. Vt. 1961), rev'd, 306
F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 959 (1963).
86 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Brown v. Smith, supra note 85; Shepherd v. State, 46
So. 2d 880 (Fla. 1950), rev'd on other grounds, 341 U.S. 50 (1951).
87 See Seals v. State, 208 Miss. 236, 44 So. 2d 61 (1950).
88 State v. BeBee, 110 Utah 484, 175 P.2d 478 (1946).
89 State v. Rogers, 241 La. 841, 132 So. 2d 819 (1961).
90 State v. Thompson, 265 Minn. 385, 123 N.W.2d 378 (1963).
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economic loss to many of the residents of the community, "

or engaged in

2
criminal activity that personally affects them.1

Excessive difficulty in empanelling a jury, owing to the fact that many
prospective jurors are disqualified on account of prejudice, should be sufficient
grounds to entitle a defendant to a change of venue. The degree of difficulty
which must be encountered will, of course, vary in direct proportion to the
stringency of juror qualification tests. In the situation where a "preponderant
sentiment" that would adversely affect jury independence and integrity is not of
the kind that manifests itself in the disqualification of veniremen, the solution
is to create independent standards regulating change of venue.3
V. The Supreme Court and Change of Venue
To date, the Supreme Court has taken three different approaches to the
problem of determining whether a defendant's constitutional right to a trial
by an impartial jury has been violated. The first approach was adumbrated in

Reynolds v. United States.9 4

It is clear, therefore, that . . . the court will . . . be called upon to de-

termine whether the nature and strength of the opinion formed [by the
juror] are such as in law necessarily to raise the presumption of partiality.
The question thus presented is one of mixed law and fact, and to be tried
...like any other issue of that character, upon the evidence. The finding of
the trial court . . . ought not to be set aside . . . unless the error is

manifest. 95

It was elaborated upon in United States v. Wood.9"
Impartiality is not a technical conception. It is a state of mind. For the
ascertainment of this mental attitude of appropriate indifference, the Constitution lays down no particular 9 7tests and procedure is not chained to
any ancient and artificial formula.
Further, this approach requires the defendant to show actual prejudice.
[I]t is not asking too much that the burden of showing essential unfairness
be sustained by him who claims such injustice and seeks to have the result
set aside, and that it be sustained not as a matter of speculation but as
a demonstrable reality. 93
This approach rests upon the presumption that the members of the jury are
impartial. This presumption can be overturned, however, by a sufficient accumulation of multifarious and unclassified factors, if such accumulation would lead
91 E.g., Miller v. Commonwealth, 248 Ky. 717, 59 S.W.2d 969 (1933).
92 E.g., People v. Jackson, 114 App. Div. 697, 100 N.Y. Supp. 126 (1906).
93 This is apparently what the Supreme Court did in Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S.

723 (1963).
94 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
95 Id. at 156.

96 299 U.S. 123 (1936).

97 Id. at 145-46.
98 Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 281 (1942).
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to the conclusion that the jurors were not to be believed when they swore their
ability to render a verdict based on the evidence produced at trial.
Irvin v. Dowd,"0 the first Supreme Court case "to set aside a state conviction
because newspaper publicity prevented a fair trial,""' affords an excellent opportunity to observe this technique in operation. In this case, 8 of 12 prospective members of the jury believed the defendant guilty, but after swearing
that their belief would yield to the evidence produced at the trial were included
on the jury. The issue was whether, in light of the surrounding circumstances,
they were to be believed. Among such surrounding circumstances were the
following. The entire area was saturated with newspaper, radio, and television
publicity. This publicity contained, inter alia, accounts of Irvin's prior criminal
record, announcements that he had confessed to the crimes in question, and
rampant excitement and speculation on the outcome of the trial. Finally, 268
out of 430 prospective jurors were excused because they held fixed opinions as
to the defendant's guilt, while an additional 102 prospective jurors entertained
some belief in Irvin's guilt. The Court concluded:
[I]t is not requiring too much that petitioner be tried in an atmosphere
undisturbed by so huge a wave of public passion and by a jury other than
one in which two-thirds of the members admit, before hearing any testimony,
to possessing a belief in his guilt.' 01
In order for Irvin's conviction to be valid under the federal constitution two
things were required: an atmosphere undisturbed by a huge wave of public
passion and a verdict by a jury other than one where two-thirds of the members
had a belief in the defendant's guilt prior to the commencement of the trial.
Although a verdict by a jury, all of whose members swear that they do not
believe the defendant guilty, would not be binding on a federal court because a
juror need not be taken at his word,0 2 if all twelve members of the jury in Irvin,
in fact, did not believe the defendant guilty, Irvin's conviction would, presumably,... still have been invalid because of the prejudicial atmosphere surrounding the trial. If this is so, Irvin is authority for the proposition that in
some circumstances a change of venue, or alternately, a continuance, is constitutionally required.
The second technique used by the Supreme Court in dealing with the problem of the impartial jury is found in Marshall v. United States. 4 In this case
the prosecutor sought to introduce evidence concerning the defendant's prior
99 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
100 DOWLING & GUNTER, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 814 (1965). In Shepherd
v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50 (1951), the Court, over strong objection from Justice Jackson, chose
to reverse on a narrow technical ground, rather than on the basis of the prejudicial atmosphere
surrounding the trial.
101 Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 728 (1961).
102 See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
103 The inconclusiveness which exists in Irvin concerning this issue was not clarified in
Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541 (1962). Beck, the last Supreme Court decision employing
the Irvin technique, was distinguished from that case in the following particulars: the
publicity ceased being of an inflammatory nature some time before trial; the trial judge granted
all the defense's challenges for cause; and no juror admitted having a belief in the defendant's
guilt prior to the commencement of the trial.
104 360 U.S. 310 (1959).
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criminal record in order to counter the defense of entrapment. The evidence
was ruled inadmissible because it was prejudicial. Nevertheless it was reported
in the newspapers and read by seven members of the jury. The trial court, after
questioning each of the seven jurors, determined that none of them would be
unduly influenced by what they had read. The Supreme Court reversed the
conviction, saying:
We have here the exposure of jurors to information of a character which
the trial judge ruled was so prejudicial it could not be directly offered as
evidence. The prejudice to the defendant is almost certain to be as great
when that evidence reaches the jury throughout news accounts, ....
105
The approach taken in Marshall stands in sharp contrast to that taken in
Irvin. Rather than overturn the presumption that the jurors were qualified, by
an accumulation of multifarious factors, the Court focused on the nature of the
publicity and reversed merely on the showing that seven members of the jury
read the newspaper accounts. Thus, the standard of impartiality was measured
by a sharply defined technical concept based upon the inadmissibility of the
evidence and not its actual effect upon the prospective jurors.
Marshall, however, does not have much significance for the law concerning
change of venue. This is because the disposition of the case was based on the
Court's exercise of its supervisory power over the lower federal courts;" 6 thus,
it is not binding on state courts? 7 Also, Marshall is not applicable to the situation involving pretrial publicity.""
The case of Rideau v. Louisiana10 9 marks the birth of the third technique
employed by the Supreme Court in dealing with the problem of insuring an impartial jury. There, the defendant's filmed confession was televised throughout
Calcasieu parish and the adjoining areas on three different occasions. Notwithstanding the fact that three of the jurors had seen the telecast, the trial judge
determined that they could render an impartial verdict. In reversing, the Supreme
Court held:
[W]e hold that it was a denial of due process of law to refuse the request
for a change of venue ....
[We do not hesitate to hold, without pausing
105 Id. at 312-13.

106 See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
107 Marshall does not appear to have been followed by most states. E.g., Wilson v. State,
217 N.E.2d 147 (Ind. 1966) ; Pacheco v. State, 414 P.2d 100 '(Nev. 1966) ; People v. Genovese,
10 N.Y.2d 478, 180 N.E. 2d 419, 225 N.Y.S. 2d 26 (1962); Glasgow v. State, 370 P.2d 933
(Okla. 1962); Smith v. State, 205 Tenn. 502, 327 S.W.2d 308 (1959). Accord, Wolfe v. Nash,
313 F.2d 393 (8th Cir. 1963) (habeas corpus petitioner seeking relief from a state conviction).
Alaska, by contrast, has expressly adopted Marshall. Watson v. State, 413 P.2d 22
(Alaska 1966). See Oxenberg v. State, 362 P.2d 893 (Alaska), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 56
(1961). Here, the conviction was affirmed on the ground that the evidence would not have
been inadmissible on account of prejudice.
108 See United States v. Bowe, 360 F.2d 1 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 961 (1966).
The court in Bowe held that Marshall did not apply to the pretrial publicity in issue because the time lag made it extremely unlikely that the jurors remembered it. If Bowe is
authoritative, the implications of Marshall for change of venue are extremely limited. The
remedy in Marshall was reversal and remand for a new trial. On remand, if the defendant
could have shown that all but eleven prospective jurors had recently read the newspaper
account, he might then, but not before, have successfully moved for a change of venue.
109 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
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to examine a particularized transcript of the voir dire examination of the
members of the jury, that due process of law in this case required a trial
before a jury drawn from a community of people who had not seen and
'
heard Rideau's televised "interview."""

Rideau differs from Marshall in that the decision rests on constitutional
grounds. It deals with pretrial publicity and not the admissibility of evidence.
The distinction to be drawn between Rideau and Irvin is the distinction that
exists between a normative judgment and an empirical judgment."1 ' In certain
situations, therefore, the Supreme Court will not inquire into the voir dire examination or the atmosphere surrounding the trial, because there is no need
to establish a nexus between the publicity and the asserted prejudice."

The

nexus will be presumed.
Rideau is the first case in which the Supreme Court said that pretrial

publicity so endangered the defendant's right to be tried by an impartial jury
that a change of venue was constitutionally required. There is some ambiguity,
however, in the holding. The Court first said it was holding that the refusal to
remove the case at Rideau's request was a denial of due process. Yet, later in
the opinion it said that due process of law required a jury, none of whose members came from the community subjected to the telecast. If this means what it
says, then a change of venire, would have been a constitutionally acceptable
alternative to a change of venue. Thus, in those states that provide for the
importation of a foreign jury,"' due process is broader in scope than a change
of venue.
The significance of Rideau lies in its technique, rather than in its
substantive holding. This is because the factual situation in Rideau is extremely
limited. Its substantive holding does not seem capable of being greatly extended.
The Court did not engage in any general discussion of the problem of pretrial
publicity, but rather limited itself to the specific issue before it. The Court made
quite clear that it regarded such use of television inimical to justice and that
it was striling at the practice of televising confessions. Finally, the recent case
of Sheppard v. Maxwell. 4 casts extreme doubt on any conclusion that a change
110
111

Id. at 726-27.

(T)he Court departed from the approach it charted in . . . Irvin v. Dowd ...

where we made a careful examination of the facts in order to determine whether

prejudice resulted. In Rideau v. Louisiana . . . the Court did not stop to consider

the actual effect of the practice but struck down the conviction on the ground that
prejudice was inherent in it. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 543 (1965).
112
"[The burden of showing essential unfairness . . . as a demonstrable reality,"
Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269 (1942), need not be undertaken when television has exposed the community "repeatedly and in depth to
the spectacle of [the accused] personally confessing in detail to the crimes with
which he was later to be charged." Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 351-52
(1966).
It has been suggested that Rideau muddies the waters of clear thought. McCarthy,

Fair Trial and Prejudicial Publicity: A Need for Reform, 17 HAST. L.J. 79, 87 (1965).

Inimical to rational thought as it may be, the technique was used in Sheppard v. Maxwell,
supra; Estes v. Texas, supra note 111; Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965); and Turner
v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965).
New York has independently reached the same result as did the Supreme Court in Rideau.
People v. Martin, 19 App. Div. 2d 804, 243 N.Y.S.2d 343 (1963). "IThe effect [of televising
a defendant's confession] . . .cannot but be prejudicial." Id. at 804, 243 N.Y.S.2d at 343.
113 See note 13 supra.
114 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
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of venue is constitutionally required in cases which are distinguishable from
Rideau. Although it is true that in Sheppard the Court said that "Where there
is a reasonable likelihood that prejudicial news prior to the trial will prevent a
fair trial, the judge should continue the case until the threat abates, or transfer
it to another county not so permeated with publicity,"'1' (emphasis added)
this statement must be read against its background. The federal district court
granted the writ of habeas corpus because the state court's failure to grant
Sheppard's motion for a continuance or change of venue was a denial of due
process."1 Thus, unlike Estes v.Texas,"' the issue of prejudicial pretrial publicity
was present for decision. The Court did not merely decline to base its decision on
the issue of prejudicial pretrial publicity1 " but concluded that the pretrial publicity did not, of itself, fatally infect the trial:
We conclude that these procedures [adoption of strict rules governing the
conduct of newsmen in the courtroom; insulation of witnesses; control on
the release of information to the press; warning newspapers to check the
accuracy of their reporting; and warning the press of the impropriety of
publicizing material not introduced at the proceedings] would have been
sufficient to guarantee Sheppard a fair trial .... 319
Thus, if Sheppard can be read as holding that methods short of a change
of venue will, in cases unlike Rideau, be sufficient to meet federal constitutional
requirements, Irvin, to the extent that it requires a change of venue to afford
a criminal defendant his constitutional right to a trial by an impartial jury, is
no longer good law. The weakness of any such reading of Sheppard is, however;
the possibility that the Court concluded, sub silentio, that under the circumstances a change of venue would have been futile because there was no place
free of prejudice to which the case could have been removed. 20
In conclusion, it can be said that in no case coming from the Supreme
Court has it been unambiguously held that a change of venue is coextensive
with due process requirements. Further, the tone, if not the holding, of Sheppard
is to the effect that in most cases procedures can be taken during the trial that
will save a conviction from any taint of unconstitutionality.
VI. Conclusion
A change of venue is not, in present theory, a panacea to the problems
posed by pretrial publicity. Its effectiveness depends not upon its ability to

115

Id. at 363.

116 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 231 F. Supp. 37 (S.D. Ohio 1964), revd, 346 F.2d 707 (6th
Cir. 1965), rev'd, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
117 The issue in Estes, as formulated by the Court, was whether the defendant was "deprived of . . . due process by the televising and broadcasting of his trial." Estes v. Texas,
381 U.S. 532, 535 (1965).
118 "[W]e cannot say that Sheppard was denied due process by the judge's refusal to take
precautions against the influence of pretrial,publicity alone .... " Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384
U.S. 333, 354 '(1966).
119 Id. at 358.
120 However, in Irvin, the trial which was condemned had been previously removed. -
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prevent publicity tending to generate or nurture the growth of prejudice,''
but upon its ability to remove a defendant from a poisoned atmosphere. Thus,
where the prejudicial publicity is widespread, 2 or of the kind likely to follow
a defendant wherever he goes,'23 change of venue is an impotent protective
device. On the other hand, when the prejudicial publicity is rooted in circumstances peculiar to a particular community and draws its strength from only
those circumstances, removal is indeed a most effective protective device.
An examination of the cases reveals that more often than not, removal is
an inherently effective protective device. Thus, writers in the field are correct
in concluding that courts have failed to use venue change to its fullest possible
extent in promoting the ends of justice.'2 4
The reasons that explain this judicial hesitancy are several. Removal is
capable of working an extreme dislocation in the administration of criminal
justice. It is expensive and generally inconvenient, and it has excellent potential
as a dilatory tactic. Further, it amounts to an admission that justice cannot be
done in the forum in which the motion is made, which is a severe blow to
people who pride themselves in their ability to be fair to their fellows. Finally,
removal runs counter to the tradition that the administration of criminal law
is primarily the concern of the community in which the crime is committed.'
All of these reasons fall, of course, before a case of genuine need; this is
the crux of the matter. The defendant will always argue that his situation presents a case of genuine need. The typical judicial response, in syllogistic form
is: if other devices designed to protect the right to an impartial jury are effective,
there is no need for a change of venue. Other devices, notably the voir dire, axe
effective; therefore the defendant is not entitled to a change of venue. The
flaw, if any, in this syllogism is not in its form, but in the content of the middle
term, which is the efficacy of the voir dire. The fact that removal is a relatively
drastic remedy is sufficient justification for treating it as operationally dependent
upon the efficacy of milder protective devices. However, the standards which
are used to determine the efficacy of those milder protective devices are insensitive to the demands of justice; and these standards, absent the most stringent
demands of policy and necessity, must be strengthened to perform the task for
which they were created -

justice.
John A. Burgess

121 It seems not to have been noted that change of venue might have vast potential for
use as a punitive device to prevent prejudicial publicity at the outset, rather then merely
protecting a defendant from its harmful effects. It would not be baseless conjecture to
predict that the Supreme Court's decision in Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963),
effectively concluded the practice of televising defendants' confessions. If the normative
judgment made in Rideau were made as to other types and forms of publicity, the technique
of changing venue might constitute an effective means of curbing prejudicial publicity. It
would be, however, the last act of desperate men.
122 See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
123 See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
124 ABA, ADvIsoRY COMM. REPORT ON FREE PRESS AND FAIR TRIAL, STANDARDS RELATING
TO FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS 121 (tent. draft 1966); Austin, Prejudice and Change of
Venue, 68 Dicx. L. RFv. 401, 408 (1964); Jaffe, supra note 61. Of course, any estimate of
the degree to which courts have declined to use removal in order to protect a criminal defendant's right to an impartial jury must be qualified to the extent that the reported cases, generally, give no indication of the number of times in which change of venue was granted.
125 The viability of this tradition in the modem mass-urban community is somewhat
questionable.

